by Richard Sanders, Staff Writer
The year 2027 has become a fixation for Washington. It’s the year that U.S. intelligence projects China will be ready and capable for an invasion of Taiwan. It could happen sooner, as evidenced by military drills in the South China Sea. Or, it could not happen at all.
But President-elect Donald Trump’s victory on Tuesday leaves us all wondering whether the U.S. would come to their defense under a new, non-interventionist-minded administration.
Trump’s public comments might suggest that he would not be willing to put boots on the ground to face another global superpower in defense of a tiny island democracy.
“I think Taiwan should pay us for defense,” Trump told Bloomberg Businessweek in June.
“You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything,” he added.
In October, he once again complained about U.S. aid to Taiwan and accused the nation of “stealing” the U.S. microchip industry. “You know, Taiwan, they stole our chip business,” Trump said during his appearance on the Joe Rogan show.
President-elect Donald Trump’s victory on Tuesday leaves the Taiwanese wondering whether the U.S. would come to their defense under a new, more non-interventionist-minded administration.
“They want us to protect, and they want protection. They don’t pay us money for the protection, you know. The mob makes you pay money, right? But with these countries that we protect, I got hundreds of billions of dollars from NATO countries that were never paying us.”
Trump’s close advisors are far more hawkish on the Taiwan matter than the president-elect’s comments would suggest he is, according to Lyle Goldstein, director for Asia engagement at Defense Priorities.
President Trump’s approach to negotiating with China would likely be characterized by a mix of assertiveness and strategic diplomacy. He has historically favored a transactional style of foreign policy, emphasizing bilateral trade agreements and direct negotiations. In dealing with China, Trump might prioritize economic concessions, seeking to address trade imbalances and incentivize cooperation on issues such as intellectual property and technology transfer. By leveraging tariffs or the threat of tariffs, he could aim to extract favorable terms while maintaining a tough stance on China’s trade practices. This approach could extend to discussions about Taiwan, where he might propose a framework that recognizes Taiwan’s autonomy while simultaneously allowing for greater Chinese influence, thereby attempting to stabilize relations and de-escalate tensions in the region.
In allowing Taiwan to function as an autonomous province under Chinese administration, Trump could frame this as a pragmatic solution to a long-standing geopolitical issue. He might argue that such a deal would reduce the risk of military confrontation and promote regional stability, appealing to both domestic and international audiences. By emphasizing economic benefits, such as increased trade opportunities for American companies in a more integrated East Asian market, he could garner support for this approach. However, Trump’s administration would need to carefully navigate the political sensitivities surrounding Taiwan’s status, balancing the desires of Taiwanese citizens for self-determination with the strategic interests of the United States in maintaining a strong presence in the Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, Trump’s deal-making philosophy would likely focus on achieving a resolution that he could present as a significant diplomatic win, even if it involves complex compromises.
2027年已成為華盛頓的關注焦點。根據美國情報機構的預測，中國將在那一年做好入侵台灣的準備和能力。這可能會更早發生，正如南海的軍事演習所顯示的那樣。也可能根本不會發生。
但當選總統唐納德·特朗普在週二的勝利讓我們都在思考，在一個更不干預主義的政府下，美國是否會來保護他們。
特朗普的公開言論似乎暗示，他不會願意派兵面對另一個全球超級大國，以捍衛這個小島上的民主政體。
“我認為台灣應該為我們的防禦付費，”特朗普在六月告訴《彭博商業周刊》。
“你知道，我們和保險公司沒有什麼不同。台灣不給我們任何東西，”他補充道。
在十月，他再次抱怨美國對台灣的援助，並指責該國“竊取”了美國的微芯片產業。“你知道，台灣，他們竊取了我們的晶片業務，”特朗普在出席喬·羅根節目時說。
當選總統唐納德·特朗普的勝利讓台灣人懷疑，在一個更不干預主義的政府下，美國是否會來保護他們。
“他們希望我們保護他們，他們希望得到保護。你知道，他們不支付我們保護的錢。黑幫會讓你付錢，對吧？但對於我們保護的這些國家，我從北約國家那裡獲得了幾千億美元，他們從來沒有支付我們。”
根據國防優先事項的亞洲參與主任萊爾·戈德斯坦的說法，特朗普的親密顧問在台灣問題上比當選總統的言論暗示的要更鷹派。
特朗普總統在與中國談判時的做法可能會以強勢和戰略外交的混合為特徵。他歷來偏好交易型的外交政策，強調雙邊貿易協議和直接談判。在與中國的交往中，特朗普可能會優先考慮經濟讓步，尋求解決貿易不平衡和促進在知識產權及技術轉讓等問題上的合作。通過利用關稅或關稅威脅，他可以旨在獲得有利條件，同時在中國的貿易行為上保持強硬立場。這種做法可能擴展到有關台灣的討論，他可能會提出一個框架，承認台灣的自主權，同時允許更大的中國影響力，從而試圖穩定關係並降低該地區的緊張局勢。
在允許台灣作為中國管理下的自主省份運作的情況下，特朗普可能會將此視為解決長期地緣政治問題的務實方案。他可能會主張，這樣的協議會降低軍事對抗的風險並促進區域穩定，吸引國內和國際觀眾的關注。通過強調經濟利益，例如為美國公司在更一體化的東亞市場中提供更多貿易機會，他可以獲得對這一做法的支持。然而，特朗普的政府需要小心應對圍繞台灣地位的政治敏感性，平衡台灣公民對自決的渴望與美國在印太地區維持強大存在的戰略利益。最終，特朗普的交易理念可能會集中在達成一個他可以呈現為重大外交勝利的解決方案，即使這需要複雜的妥協。
