Richard Sanders, Taipei
Iran has signaled that it may begin charging fees for the use of undersea communication cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz, a move that has intensified concerns over the security of digital infrastructure in the Persian Gulf.
Ebrahim Zolfaghari, spokesman for the operational command of the Iranian Armed Forces, said Tehran intends to impose charges on undersea cables crossing the strategic waterway. The announcement comes amid heightened regional tensions and growing debate over whether Iran could use the Gulf’s digital networks as leverage in a broader confrontation.
Since May 18, the newly formed Persian Gulf Strait Authority has overseen the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. The body was established by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council to monitor compliance with maritime rules set by Tehran. Iranian officials say the authority was created in response to a US-led naval blockade that began in April.
Tehran now treats the Strait of Hormuz, including its underwater infrastructure, as an area of strategic control. That position has raised alarm among Gulf states and international technology firms, given the importance of subsea cables to internet connectivity, banking systems, cloud services, logistics and government platforms across the region.
Concerns over the vulnerability of these cables are not new. In 2019, Iranian state media aired claims that disruption to cables in the Strait of Hormuz could affect a major share of global internet traffic. The figure cited at the time – up to 70% – was widely viewed as exaggerated, since global data traffic can be rerouted through alternative corridors, including the Red Sea, Egypt and the Mediterranean.
Still, analysts say the broader warning was significant. Even if damage to cables in the strait would not bring down the global internet, Gulf countries could face serious consequences, including slower connections, higher latency, reduced bandwidth and interruptions to key digital services.
Iran returned to the issue in 2026 with a sharper political and strategic focus. In April, Tasnim news agency, which is linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, published a report mapping cable and cloud infrastructure across the Persian Gulf. The report appeared to underline the dependence of Gulf monarchies on maritime internet routes and suggested that such infrastructure could become part of the wider conflict environment.
By May, Iranian state media had expanded the argument into an economic and regulatory proposal. The narrative shifted from simply highlighting cable vulnerabilities to suggesting that foreign technology companies and operators should pay fees for using cables that pass through waters Tehran considers subject to its authority. The idea also included tighter Iranian oversight of cable operators and possible control over maintenance and repair activity.
From a military standpoint, the cables are vulnerable. The Strait of Hormuz is relatively shallow, crowded with maritime traffic and difficult to secure fully. Most damage to subsea cables worldwide is caused not by deliberate sabotage, but by anchors, fishing equipment or navigation accidents. In a tense military environment, the risk of disruption becomes even higher.
Iran may also argue that it has legal grounds to regulate parts of the cable network near its coast. Under international maritime law, coastal states have certain rights over the installation and maintenance of subsea infrastructure in waters under their jurisdiction. Tehran appears to be using this argument to frame the cables not only as international communication links, but also as infrastructure subject to Iranian control.
However, deliberately cutting or damaging undersea cables would carry major political and military risks. The United States, Gulf states and major technology companies would likely view such an act as an attack on critical international infrastructure. Because the Strait of Hormuz is heavily monitored by military forces, any direct sabotage would be difficult to conceal and could invite a severe response.
Several major communication systems pass through or near the Strait of Hormuz, including regional and international cable networks. These include systems such as FALCON, which connects India, Oman, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Egypt; Ooredoo Gulf Pathway, which carries regional Gulf traffic; SEA-ME-WE 5, linking Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Europe; and TGN-Gulf, which connects Gulf states with India and broader global networks.
If one cable were damaged, operators would likely reroute traffic through backup systems. But simultaneous damage to multiple cables could seriously affect service quality across the Gulf. Banking, digital government services, corporate communications, messaging platforms, cloud services and logistics systems could all face disruptions.
Repairing damaged cables would also be difficult during a regional crisis. Specialized repair ships would need safe access to the affected area, and their operations could require at least tacit approval from Tehran. In that scenario, the repair process itself could become a bargaining tool.
The global internet would probably not collapse if cables in the Strait of Hormuz were damaged. Alternative routes exist, and Europe-Asia traffic relies on several pathways. But Gulf states would be far more exposed because of their reliance on maritime data routes and international cloud connectivity.
For now, Iran appears more likely to use the threat of disruption as a form of strategic pressure rather than physically severing cables. Even without direct action, the warning could influence market behavior, increase insurance and repair risks, push Gulf states to reassess backup routes and force investors to consider digital infrastructure vulnerability alongside oil and shipping risks.
The issue shows that the Strait of Hormuz is no longer only a chokepoint for energy supplies and tanker traffic. It is increasingly becoming a focal point in the contest over digital infrastructure, where internet cables, cloud access and data flows may become tools of geopolitical pressure.
