Richard Sanders, Phnom Penh
Corey Wetherholt, founder of CivDiv LLC and a former U.S. Marine Corps infantryman, has emerged as a leading voice on small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) and first-person view (FPV) drone operations. His career trajectory—from conventional Marine infantry to guerrilla-style operations in Iraq, early advisory roles in Ukraine, and hands-on FPV engineering—mirrors the rapid evolution of modern conflict dominated by low-cost drones, persistent surveillance, and asymmetric tactics. Through CivDiv LLC, Wetherholt now delivers systems-level advisory support to military units and defense organizations, drawing on hard-won lessons about what works—and what fails—when small UAS meet battlefield realities.
In a recent interview, Wetherholt reflected on the experiences that reshaped his understanding of warfare. “It was definitely as a guerrilla fighter in Iraq directly after serving in the U.S. Marines,” he said. “This taught me that there are tons of ways to fight and win wars, not just offensive and overwhelming power. To operate using the tactics of the enemy I was training against in the Marines really broadened my tactical knowledge as well as the geopolitical side of conflict.”
Operating in Syria and Iraq alongside partner forces exposed him to subterranean networks, persistent aerial surveillance, and emerging drone threats. These environments highlighted the limits of conventional doctrine. “My first encounter with drones was as a guerrilla fighter in Iraq, living in tunnel systems and under drone surveillance and attack. Completely counter to the U.S. Marine Infantry SOP’s, yet successfully resisting the newest tech coming out the gate,” Wetherholt explained. He emphasized the enduring relevance of underground warfare: “Afghanistan was won by tunnels, Vietnam was won by tunnels… tunnels should be taken more seriously, especially in the day of constant drone innovation after drone innovation.”
Wetherholt arrived in Ukraine during the early stages of the full-scale invasion, embedded with a special operations unit. He witnessed the explosive growth of small drone usage. “It started with Mavics, to have eyes in the sky being able to locate and then give real-time targeting data to the indirect fire assets was unheard of for countries without huge military budgets,” he recalled. By 2023, FPV drones proliferated rapidly. “The trust they gave the combat-experienced guys was incredible, and the only reason we see this arms race in real time continue 4.5 years later.”
His perspective evolved further as he moved into ISR operations and FPV system engineering. Each role revealed different facets of drone capabilities and constraints. As an infantryman, he learned that “complacency kills” in an era where drones exploit any lapse. As an engineer working under combat conditions, he confronted practical limitations head-on: budget and time constraints, wind, water, malfunctions, electronic warfare (EW), and especially interference from friendly systems. “Interference was surprisingly the biggest limit to drone operations,” he noted.
Wetherholt is blunt about where commercial and theoretical performance claims collapse in the field. “Definitely interference and weather. Sometimes combat operations are totally cancelled because of fog, strong wind, or you get out there just to find out the adjacent team is using the same frequency and polarization.”
He identifies common pitfalls in military integration of small UAS: overly proprietary systems that lack user-friendliness. “There’s a middle ground that has to be found, and those are the most used in Ukraine,” he said. “Most drones we got from factories had half their insides ripped out and replaced because we needed specific requirements that would work with our existing equipment.”
Field problems often only become obvious under real stress—RF issues, maintenance demands, operator workload, and environmental degradation.
Applying Ukraine’s Hard Lessons to Taiwan’s Defense
Wetherholt’s time working in Taiwan, alongside his experiences in Ukraine and the Philippines, has given him unique insight into how Ukraine’s battlefield innovations could strengthen deterrence and preparedness in the Indo-Pacific. He suggests that Taiwan could benefit significantly by accelerating small-unit experimentation and empowering combat-experienced personnel, much like Ukraine did early in the conflict.
Rapid adoption of commercial-off-the-shelf drones (starting with quadcopters for ISR and evolving into FPV strike systems) allowed Ukraine to punch above its weight against a larger adversary. For Taiwan, facing potential high-intensity threats across the strait, similar agile procurement and field modification of systems—rather than waiting for slow, proprietary platforms—could enhance survivability and create cost-effective asymmetric capabilities.
Wetherholt also stresses integrating subterranean networks with drone operations. Given Taiwan’s mountainous terrain and urban density, well-prepared tunnel systems could serve as resilient command posts, supply caches, and launch points shielded from persistent aerial surveillance—mirroring how tunnels have historically countered air and drone dominance.
Other transferable lessons include rigorous training to combat complacency, developing interoperable frequencies to avoid friendly interference, and designing user-friendly systems that can be maintained and adapted in austere conditions. “The speed of battlefield innovation in Ukraine shows what’s possible when bureaucracy steps back and lets operators drive solutions,” Wetherholt observed. For Taiwan, building a culture of rapid iteration, combined with realistic expectations around weather, Electronic Warfare, and maintenance, could play a decisive role in deterrence by signalling credible defensive depth and complicating any potential invasion plans.
His experiences across these environments highlight how terrain, culture, and operational priorities shape drone effectiveness. As adversaries continue to adapt—countering FPVs with jamming, new tactics, and their own drone innovations—the next phase of the drone fight will likely demand even greater emphasis on resilience, interoperability, and realistic expectations over marketing specifications.
Through CivDiv LLC, Wetherholt continues to bridge the gap between theory and the unforgiving realities of combat, urging defense organizations to prioritize adaptability, simplicity, and the hard lessons learned from tunnels to FPVs. In an era of proliferating small unmanned systems, his message is clear: survival and success depend on remembering what history and the battlefield have already taught.
